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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act (the Act)! to restore and maintain the "chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."s To meet 
this objective, Congress required that by 1985 no pollution be 
discharged into navigable waters.8 Congress also authorized the 
Environmental Protection Agency (the Agency) to implement 
the Act' by allowing the Agency to establish, among other 
things, limitations on various pollutants15 and commence projects 
without filing environmental impact statements.6 This past 
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376, as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977,33 U.S.C. §§ 
1251-1376 (1976). For an exhaustive discussion of the Act, see H. LIEBER, FEDERALISM 
AND CLEAN WATER (1975). See also R. HAruus, W. JEFFERY & B. STEWART, JR., INTER-
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS-A GUIDE TO WATER POLLUTION AND WATER SCARCITY 
(1974); R. MIDDLEKAUFF, WATER QUALITY CONTROL LEGISLATION (1975); L SLOAN, ENVI-
RONMENT AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1979). 
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
3. [d. § 1251(a}(1). 
4. [d. § 1251(d). 
5. Section 301(b) of the Act provides that: 
[T]here shall be achieved 
(l)(A) not later than July 1,1977, effluent limitations for point 
sources. • • which require the application of the best practica-
ble control technology currently available as defined by the 
Administrator • • • • 
(2)(A) [not later than July 1, 1983,] ••• effluent limitations 
for categories and classes of point sources • • • which shall re-
quire application of the best available technology economically 
achievable • • • with regulations issued by the Administrator 
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1976). 
In this Note, the Environmental Protection Agency and its Administrator will be 
referred to as "the Agency." 
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c) (1976). Section 51I(e) of the Act requires the Agency to file 
an environmental impact statement where it grants either federal funds to help build a 
publicly owned treatment works or a permit for a new source of pollution. "Permit" 
refers to a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 
"(1976). " 
An environmental impact statement must be filed for any "major Federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, § 102 (2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). For a survey of recent 
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term, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined the 
Agency's power under both of these provisions. 
In Association of Pacific Fisheries v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency,7 the Ninth Circuit upheld all except one of the 
methods the Agency required for the seafood processing indus-
try to reduce the amount of pollution discharged. In Kilroy v. 
Quarles,8 the Ninth Circuit limited instances in which the 
Agency had to prepare an environmental impact statement. This 
Note will first examine the facts and legal arguments of each 
case. Then congressional intent evidenced through legislative 
history will be explored. Finally, the Ninth Circuit decisions will 
be measured against th.e expressed intent of Congress. 
I. METHODS TO REDUCE POLLUTANTS DISCHARGED 
In Association of Pacific Fisheries, the Ninth Circuit up-
held the Agency's requirement for two methods of pollution re-
duction, and found a third method inadequtely supported by the 
evidence. In 1974, the Agency promulgated levels to which pollu-
tion must be reduced (pollution limitations) for the seafood 
processing industry.9 Pursuant to section 301 of the Act,to the 
Agency set pollution limitations for 1977 and additional limita-
tions for 1983. The Agency then determined methods by which 
processing plants could best comply with the required 
limitations. 
In determining its methods, the Agency distinguished 
U. L. REv. 205 (1980). 
7. 615 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Kennedy, J.; the other panel members were 
Sneed and Trask, J.J.). 
8. 614 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were Tang, 
J. and Campbell, D.J., sitting by designation). 
9. 615 F.2d at 801-02. The Agency promulgated the guidelines in two phases. The 
first phase affected catfish, crab, shrimp, and tuna. 40 C.F.R. §§ 408.10-408.16 (1980). 
The second phase affected fish meal, salmon, bottomfish, claim, oyster, sardine, scallop, 
herring fillet and abalone. 40 C.F.R. §§ 408.160-408.196, 408.290-408.296, 408.310-408.326 
(1980). Within each subcategory, the Agency set limitations measured by biological oxy-
gen demand (BOD.), total suspended solids (TSS), and oil and grease (O&G). BOD. is a 
measure of the oxygen-conswning potential of organic matter in the efHuent. TSS is a 
measure of the quality of undissolved solid matter suspended in the efHuent. O&G de-
scribes the volume of naturally occurring fish oil in the efHuent. See 615 F.2d at 802 n.2. 
Water that comes into contact with fish residue (for example, heads, tails, and internal 
organs) is measured against each of these limitations. The regulations set average 
monthly and daily levels. 
10. See note 5 supra. 
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processing plants near "population or processing centers"ll from 
those further away, and decided that plants near those centers 
must screen the larger particles out and dispose of them by 
transporting them to sanitary landfills, to other facilities for fur-
ther processing, or to approved disposal sites at sea.I2 The plants 
away from the centers must only grind the solids prior to dis-
charge. The Agency based its determination on two factors: 
costs, and an independent evaluation of the data. 
The Agency found operation, maintenance, and waste dispo-
sal costs considerably lower for plants near population centers 
due to the availability of power and workers, and lower for 
plants near processing centers due to shared disposal costs. IS 
Consequently, the Agency decided that these plants could afford 
more expensive methods of reducing pollution. The Agency also 
used a model plant and established that the plants could reduce 
pollution to the'1977 levels with the required methods.14 
The Agency prescribed two methods for plants located near 
centers to meet the 1983 limitations. One method employed dis-
solved air flotation units which funnel pressurized air into tanks 
where solids are immersed in water. The air buoys the solid par-
ticles up, allowing them to be skimmed off and used as either 
animal feed or fertilizer.lI~ The other method employed aerated 
lagoons consisting of shallow ponds. The pollutant, dumped into 
the ponds, is left there for up to fifty days, during which time it 
is biologically broken down. IS Plants located away from popula-
tion or processing centers need only screen solids out prior to 
discharge. I ? 
Again the Agency used the cost of compliance and an inde-
pendent determination of the data to establish that these were 
11. 615 F.2d at 803. The Agency defined population or processing centers as "in-
cluding but not limited to Anchorage, Cordova, Juneau, Ketchikan, Kodiak, and Peters-
burg •... " See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 408.162 (1980). The Agency, further characterized 
"processing centers" as areas where multiple plants are located. 615 F.2d at 804. 
12. 615 F.2d at 803. 
13. ld. at 804. The Agency also found construction costs of waste disposal sites more 
expensive to plants away from population centers because of rugged terrain. ld. 
14. ld. at 809. 
15. ld. at 816. 
16. ld. at 819. 
17. ld. at 802. 
3
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the best methods for the plants to meet the 1983 limitations. 
Cost considerations included capital costs and operation and 
maintenance costs. IS The independent determination was a sin-
gle study which determined that these methods would best meet 
the desired goal. 
The Association of Pacific Fisheries (the Association), a 
trade organization of fish canners and processors, challenged the 
1977 regulations on botTrl cost and independent study determina-
tion grounds. First, the· Association argued that the Agency 
based costs on an unsubstantiated distinction determined by 
plant location.19 The Association further claimed that the 
Agency failed to adequately weigh the incremental benefits 
which would result frOom increased costs and that the Agency 
failed to consider all the relevant costs.20 Second, the Associa-
tion challenged the accuracy and adequacy of the data the 
Agency used to detemline the pollution limitations.21 In addi-
tion, the Association questioned whether the 1983 limitations 
were, as the statute mandated, "available [and] economically 
achievable"22 through oither the dissolved air flotation unit28 or 
the aerated lagoon2' method. 
A. SCREENING 
Cost Factors 
The Association argued that the Agency's distinction be-
tween processing plants near population or processing centers 
and those further away from such centers was not supported by 
the evidence and that the Agency's designation of the cities as 
population centers was arbitrary.2~ The Ninth Circuit rejected 
both arguments, holding that the record sufficiently supported 
the much lower construction, operation, and maintenance costs 
of plants near population or processing centers compared to 
those further away.26 The Ninth Circuit also decided that the 
18. [d. at 818. 
19. [d. at 803-04. 
20. [d. at S06-09. 
21. [d. at S09-10, S12. 
22. See note 5 supra. 
23. 615 F.2d at S16. 
24. [d. at S19. 
25. [d. at S04-05. 
26. [d. at S04. For example, the record indicated that measuring all construction 
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Agency had substantial discretion to determine what constituted 
a population center.2'1 
The Association also challenged the adequacy of the 
Agency's consideration of increased benefits from increased 
costs. Again, the Ninth Circuit found such considerations within 
the Agency's discretion.2s Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the Association's focus on improved water quality 
was misdirected. Prior to the 1972 Act, the emphasis was on im-
proved water quality. With the Act, however, the focus shifted 
to regulating pollution before it is discharged into water and af-
fects its quality. Consequently, the court rejected the improved 
water quality standard.29 
Next, the Association argued that screening and dumping 
pollutants into specific sites in the ocean and grinding and 
dumping it near the shoreline had the same polluting effect.SO 
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that dumping screened solids 
into the ocean was only one of several alternatives,81 that higher 
tidal activity further away from the shoreline aids dispersion of 
screened solids, and that improved water quality near the shore-
line is itself a benefit.82 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit set aside the Association's claim 
that compliance was impractical because an excessive number of 
costs against a standardized scale, population centers such as Anchorage and Juneau had 
cost factors of 1.5 and 1.6 respectively. Conversely, plants located away from such cen-
ters had a higher cost factor of 2.5. [d. The record also supported the distinction based 
on operation and maintenance costs. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
27. 615 F.2d at 805. 
28. [d. The Ninth Circuit supported its position with the Conference Report on the 
bill which precedea the Act. The report found the balance between costs and benefits to 
be where added benefits are "wholly out of proportion to the costs." CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, A LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL Ac:r AMEND-
MENTS OF 1972 at 170 (1973) [hereinafter cited as L.H.}. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Environmental Protection Agency v. National 
Crushed Stone Assoc., 101 S. Ct. 295 (1980), supported this Agency discretion. It stated 
that 1977 limitations are a "conclusion by the [Agency} that the costs imposed on the 
industry are worth the benefits in pollution reduction that will be gained by meeting 
those limits." [d. at 303. 
29. 615 F.2d at 805. See I. SLOAN, ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW 23-28 (2d ed. 1979). 
30. 615 F.2d at 806. 
31. [d. 
32. [d. at 807. 
5
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plants would close due to the limitations.33 The court decided 
that the price increase, not the number of plants closing, deter-
mined the practicality of compliance.34 The Ninth Circuit found 
the price increase insignificant,31S and adopted the Agency's con-
clusion that the 1977 limitations were economically practical.3s 
Data Considered 
Having found that the Agency adequately considered costs 
of compliance through the screening methods, the Ninth Circuit 
then addressed the Ansociation's second major argument: that 
the Agency failed to ad.equately consider the data used to set the 
1977 limitations. The Agency based its 1977 limitations on a 
model plant which it constructed with processing data from 1973 
and financial data from 1968 to 1972.37 The Association claimed 
that using processing data from 1973, an unproductive season, 
caused the Agency to underestimate the amount of fish 
processed per hour.3s The Agency responded that even if pro-
duction was underestimated, any effect it had was minimal be-
cause processing costs increased at a much slower rate than the 
amount processed did.89 For example, a plant that processed ten 
times more fish than another plant only had an increased cost of 
1.4 times.40 The Ninth Circuit refused to disturb the Agency's 
determination because the Agency adequately considered all the 
information before it;1I1 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Association's attempt to in-
33. Id. at 808. The Association based its argument on an Agency-conducted study 
which predicted that 7 of 16 plants would close because of the new limitations. Id. 
34. Id. at 808-09. 
35. Id. The Agency projected price increases to range from 0.3% to 0.5%. 
36. Id. at 809. 
37.Id. 
38. Id. at 809-10. For processing data, the Agency used a 42 day average processing 
season, although the Association claimed that 14 to 30 days was more accurate. The 
Agency also used an average working day of 18 hours, although the Association claimed 
that an 18-hour work day was rare. Finally, the Agency determined that large processors 
processed about 8.3 tons per hour, medium processors, 5.0 tons, and small processors, 1.1 
tons, although the Association claimed 40, 20, and 10 tons, respectively, was more 
accurate. 
39. Id. at 810. 
40.Id. 
41. Id. at 810-11. The Ninth Circuit decided that some variation may be allowed 
within a subcategory. Id. (citing American Iron & Steel Inst. v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977». 
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troduce independent studies conducted after the Agency set the 
pollution limitations}2 The Ninth Circuit said it would only con-
sider studies which showed "that the Agency proceeded upon as-
sumptions that were entirely fictional or utterly without scien-
tific support. "43 
The Ninth Circuit refused to question the Agency's decision 
to stress water and waste management practices when it deter-
mined attainable limitations}4 Instead, the court found suffi-
cient evidence in the record to support the Agency's emphasis 
on water management practices4G and held that the Agency had 
the power to recommend dry cleanup methods46 to improve 
those practices.4'1 
After rejecting all of the Association's challenges to the 1977 
limitations, the court addressed the Association's attacks on the 
dissolved air flotation unit and aerated lagoon methods for the 
1983 limitations. 
42. 615 F.2d at 811-12. 
43. ld. at 812. The Ninth Circuit enumerated several alternatives by which the As-
sociation could have challenged the limitations. Firat, the Association could have filed for 
reconsideration of its original action under appropriate circumstances. In OIjato Chapter 
of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the circuit court suggested that 
when a revision of the limitations is sought, a petition should be submitted to the 
Agency. The petitioner also could have filed supporting material explaining why the limi-
tations should be changed. If denied, the petitioner then could have sought judicial re-
view. ld. at 666. . 
Next, the Association could have applied for a variance under § 301(c) of the Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976). Third, the Association could have challenged the limitations 
during the annual revision required by § 304(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976). 
Finally, the Association could have challenged the limitations at the five year review 
required by § 301(d) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 131l(d) (1976). 
44. 615 F.2d at 813. The Association maintained that the Agency should have con-
sidered the species and sexual maturity of the fish processed, the level of mechanization 
of each plant, and the condition of the fish when delivered to the plant. ld. The Agency 
responded that poor water management practices, including continuous use of water 
hoses to wash areas of waste buildup, excessive use of water when not processing fish, use 
of outdated machines which require more water to operate and use of water during rest 
breaks, were the major causes of pollution variability. ld. at 813-14. 
45. ld. at 815. The Agency cited two studies which estimated that about 20 to 30% 
of the water use occurred during cleanup operations and was responsible for about 10 to 
20% of the total pollution. ld. 
46. ld. at 815-16. Dry cleanup methods include shoveling solid waste into bins 
before water cleanup and using conveyor belts instead of water to transport waste. ld. at 
615. 
47. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Association's claim that dry cleanup methods 
required in-plant changes. The court found no such changes in the model plant on which 
the Agency based its recommendation. ld. at 815. 
7
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B. DISSOLVED AIR FLOTATION UNITS 
Cost Factor 
The Association first argued that. the 1983 limitations must 
be based on the incrE~ased benefits resulting from increased 
costs.48 The Ninth Circuit noted that in 1977 cost calculations, 
the benefits must be considered in relation to costs although the 
Agency had discretion to determine where added costs did not 
yield adequate benefits.49 The court then found that for the 1983 
cost considerations the Agency must only include costs in its cal-
culations without determining its relation to benefits. 50 The 
Ninth Circuit decided that the Agency fulfilled the statutory 
mandate for the dissolved air flotation units because it consid-
ered the costs of construction, labor, power, chemicals, and 
fue1.51 
Data Considerations 
The Association argued that the Agency's 1983 limitations 
for dissolved air flotation units were arbitrary and capricious be-
cause they were based on a single study.52 The Ninth Circuit 
found that Congress did not intend to require more than one 
study for setting 1983llimitations.5s Consequently, the court held 
48. The Association repeated the arguments it made for computing costs for 1977 
limitations. See text accompanying note 28 8upra. 
49. 615 F.2d at 817-18. The Ninth Circuit recogni2ed the relative costs and benefit 
considerations mandated by the language of § 304(b)(1)(B) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
1314(b)(1)(B) (1976). The legislative history of the Act, however, expressed the intent 
that the Agency should "limit the application of technology only where the additional 
degree of efHuent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs .... " L.H. at 170 
(emphasis added). 
50. 615 F.2d at 817-18. Again, the court examined the statutory language and found 
no requirement to weigh costs against benefits. Section 304(b)(2)(B) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1314(b)(2)(B) (1976). Instead, the court found evidence to the contrary in legislative 
history. There the committee said that the 1983 limitations must be determined "with-
out regard to cost." L.H. at 170. The Ninth Circuit also cited Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978), in which the court only required the Agency to 
consider costs along with other factors. 
51. 615 F.2d at 818. Land costs were not considered because the amount of land 
needed was minimal. Id. 
52. Id. at 816. The study, conducted by the British Columbia Seafood Industry and 
the Canadian Fisheries Research Board, determined that the dissolved air flotation units 
reduced BOD6 by 80%, TSS by 90%, and O&G by 95%. Id. 
53. Id. at 816. The House Report declared that "one operating facility which dem-
onstrates that the level can be achieved" is sufficient for setting guidelines. L.H. at 798. 
The Ninth Circuit added that all the Agency must show is that the best existing dis-
solved air flotation unit can meet the limitations. The study the Agency relied on showed 
8
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that the Agency adequately determiited that plants using dis-
solved air flotation units could meet 1983 limitations. G4 
C. AERATED LAGOONS 
Costs Factors 
The Association argued that the Agency failed to consider 
all the costs for aerated lagoons. The Court agreed that the 
Agency failed to consider land acquisition costs. ISIS The Ninth 
Circuit decided that although the Agency did not have to con-
sider land acquisition costs for dissolved air flotation units be-
cause of the minimal land needed, the court held that the 
Agency must consider this cost for aerated lagoons which require 
much larger areas of land.1S8 Consequently, the court remanded 
this portion of the Agency's decision for reevaluation.1S7 
Data Considerations 
Finally, the Association argued that the Agency's single 
study which supported aerated lagoons failed to adequately 
prove that plants using this method could obtain the 1983 limi-
tations. The Ninth Circuit agreed and found the study inade-
quate.ISS The Ninth Circuit remanded the aerated lagoons 
method to the Agency for further data as well as cost determina-
tions, but affirmed the Agency's decisions in all other respects.1S9 
that for salmon, the dissolved air flotation unit can reduce BOD. by 80%, TSS by 90% 
and O&G by 95%.615 F.2d at 816. Additional studies involving other fish showed sub-
stantial reduction in all three subcategories. ld. at 816-17. 
54. ld. at 818. 
55. ld. at 819. 
56. ld. at 820. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Agency's reliance on American Iron & 
Steel Inst. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F.2d 1027 (3rd Cir. 1976), modified 
on other grounds, 560 F.2d 589 (1977), in which the court held that the costs of land 
should not be considered because of its variability depending on quality. The Associa-
tion of Pacific Fisheries court reasoned that because the cost of screening and other 
required changes which also vary with the quality of land were considered in costs calcu-
lations, land acquisition costs should also be considered. 615 F.2d at 820. 
57. 615 F.2d at 820. 
58. ld. at 819. The study failed to show the analytical approach the Agency used or 
the possibility that aerated lagoons would be used for more than limited types of sea-
food. Furthermore, the study failed to illustrate the effectiveness of the lagoons. ld. 
59. ld. at 820. 
9
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II. EXEMPTION FROM FILING AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMP ACT STATE!vIENT 
In Kilroy v. Quarles,60 the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed 
section 511(c) of the Act, which exempts the agency from pre-
paring an environmental impact statement (Statement) in cer-
tain situations.61 Los Angeles owns and operates the Hyperion 
Wastewater Treatment Plant.62 Until 1975, the plant applied 
primary treatment63 to about two-thirds of its sewage and secon-
dary treatment to the rest.64 Mter treatment, the solid waste is 
separated from the liquid waste. The plant then discharges the 
liquid waste into the ocean five miles from shore, and the solid 
waste (or sludge), seven miles out.6~ 
In 1975, however, the Agency ordered Hyperion to apply 
secondary treatment to all pollution before discharge and to stop 
the discharge of sludge.66 The Agency did not have a final plan 
for disposal of the sludge, and so it designed an interim plan as a 
condition to the renewal of Hyperion's permit to discharge pol-
lution.67 The interim lplan required the plant to separate the 
sludge from the water and to transport the sludge to a sanitary 
landfill.68 To help effectuate the interim plan, the Agency in-
tended to award Hyperion a federal grant.69 
60. 614 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980). 
61. See note 6 supra. 
62. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Quarles, 440 F. Supp. 316, 318 (D.C. Cal. 1977). Be-
cause the Kilroy COurt'8 recapitulation of the facts is inadequate, facts are taken from 
the district court's decision. 
63. 40 C.F.R. § 125.58{m) (1980) define8 primary treatment as "the first stage in 
wastewater treatment where substantially all floating or settleable solids, are removed by 
flotation and/or sedimentation." 
64. 440 F. Supp. at 318. 40 C.F.R. § 133.102 (1980) defines secondary treatment as 
that treatment through which "the minimum level of effluent quality. . . in terms of the 
parameters - biological oxygen demand, suspended solids and pH" can be attained. 
65. 440 F. Supp. at 318. 
66. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Costle, 586 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1978). Pacific 
Legal Foundation v. Costle was factually the same as Pacific Legal Foundation v. 
Quarles. Costle, however, raised different issues which the Supreme Court subsequently 
reversed in Costle v. Pacific )i..egal Foundation, 100 S. Ct. 1095 (1980). The Supreme 
Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in requiring the Agency to hold a public hearing 
on every § 402 (permit) decision without first finding a material fact in dispute. See note 
6 supra. Instead, the Court fOlmd that § 402 of the Act only requires an "opportunity for 
[a] public hearing." 100 S. Ct. at 1105 (emphasis added) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342{a){1) 
(1976». 
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Plaintiffs, three sometime members of the Los Angeles City 
Council, one Los Angeles property owner, and the city of Tor-
rance, argued that the Agency's plan would force Los Angeles to 
finance a project which would adversely affect the land without 
any prior determination that the land was a better receptacle for 
the sludge than the ocean. They sued on two bases.70 They 
sought an injunction against commencement of the interim plan 
until the Agency filed a Statement, as the National Evniron-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (the Policy Act) requires of all "major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the human environ-
ment."71 Plaintiffs also sued the Agency for a second Statement, 
arguing that the Agency's declared national policy against ocean 
disposal of sludge itself constituted a "major Federal action."72 
The district court decided that the Agency's action in either case 
was exempt from the Statement requirement.73 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed and adopted the rationale of the district 
COurt.74 Consequently, arguments and holdings will be refer-
enced to the district court's opinion. 
Injunction Denied 
Plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction against commence-
ment of the interim plan until the Agency filed a Statement. 
They argued that under section 511(c) of the Act,75 any grant of 
federal funds to help construct a publicly owned sewage treat-
ment works required a Statement.78 The Agency agreed, and 
promised not to grant the funds until a Statement was com-
70. Id. at 320. The district court dismissed plaintiff's third cause of action-that 
ocean disposal be considered as an alternative-as improperly raised. Under this claim, 
plaintiffs argued that the Agency exceeded the scope of the Act by regulating the dump-
ing of sludge from vessels beyond the territorial seas. Consequently, plaintiffs contended 
the exemption statute no longer insulated the no-sludge policy. 
The court found that because plaintiffs did not seek injunctive relief to prohibit 
sludge dumping from vessels, the claim raised was limited to the Agency's consideration 
of vessel dumping of sludge as an alternative to land disposal. After so limiting the cause 
of action, the court held that the Agency need not consider the vessel dumping alterna-
tive. 440 F. Supp. at 327. This holding was not appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
71. [d. See note 6 supra. Los Angeles argued that under § 51l(c)(1) of the Act the 
funding of a publicly owned treatment plant constituted a major federal action signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment. See note 6 supra. 
72. 440 F. Supp. at 321. 
73. [d. at 320, 326. 
74. 614 F.2d at 227. 
75. See note 6 supra. 
76. 440 F. Supp. at 320. 
11
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pleted. Plaintiffs argued that that was not enough because the 
Agency required Los Angeles to commence the interim plan with 
its share of the funds.'17 The district court found that the lan-
guage of the exemption statute set forth two situations in which 
the Agency had to prepare a Statement.7S Neither situation, 
however, applied to the interim plan and the court decided that 
the Agency acted within its discretion when it required Los An-
geles to commence construction of the sanitary landfill before 
the federal funds were available.79 
No Statement Required for the Declared National Policy 
The Agency endorsed a national policy to eliminate all 
ocean disposal of sludge. so This endorsement, plaintiffs argued, 
constituted a "major Federal action" within the meaning of the 
Policy Act for which the Agency must prepare a Statement. 
Plaintiffs reasoned that only section 403 of the ActS1 regulated 
ocean disposal of pollution and that it did not authorize the 
Agency to declare tho 'national policy. Because section 511(c) of 
the Act only exempts Agency actions which are within the Act, 
plaintiffs concluded that the Agency acted beyond its power 
under the Act by declaring the policy and could not use section 
511(c) to bypass the Statement requirement.s2 In response, the 
Agency argued that the language of section 301 of the Act im-
plied that the Agency had the power to declare the policy.sS 
This issue was one of first impression, therefore the district 
court based most of its discussion on the legislative history of 
sections 301 and 403. The court determined that Congress in-
tended section 301 to regulate ocean disposal of pollution,tl" that 
section 403 merely supplement section 301 where section 301 did 
77. [d. The Act allows the federal government to fund up to 75% of the cost of 
constructing a treatment works; the individual entity must pay the rest. 33 U.S.C. § 
1282(a)(1) (1976). 
78. See note 6 supra. 
79. 440 F. Supp. at 320. The district court decided that a construction schedule for 
the interim plan was a condition of renewing Hyperion's permit and could be classified 
as neither an Agency grant of federal funds nor a permit for a new pollution source. [d. 
80. 440 F. Supp. at 321. 
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). 
82. 440 F. Supp. at 321. 
83. The Agency pointed to § 301 of the Act where all publicly owned sewage treat-
ment works must apply secondary treatment to sludge. 40 C.F.R. § 133 (1980) defines 
secondary treatment as the elimination of sludge discharge. 440 F. Supp. at 332. 
84. 440 F. Supp. at 326. 
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not go far enough,85 and that, even it section 301 did not regu-
late ocean disposal of pollution, the Agency still had the power 
under section 403 to declare the policy.88 The district court con-
cluded that the Agency was exempt from preparing a Statement 
under section 511(c) for its declared national policy against 
ocean disposal'of sludge.87 
Congressional Intent 
To determine how Congress intended section 301 of the Act 
to be construed, Congress expected the focus to be on section 
304,88 which lists factors the Agency must consider to set per-
missible pollution levels for 1977 and 1983. For 1977 limitations, 
section 304(b)(1)(B) required the Agency to compare the total 
cost of implementing a technology to the resulting benefits.89 
The Agency, however, has discretion to determine within this 
cost-benefit analysis the point at which added benefits do not 
justify the added costs.90 By so limiting the cost-benefit analysis, 
the Agency can maintain uniform pollution limitations within a 
class or category of pollution sources.91 
In addition to these cost factors, section 304(b)(1)(B) re-
quires the Agency to consider such other factors as the age of 
equipment and facilities, the development of present and future 
technology, and "engineering aspects" required to apply the new 
technology. The Agency's consideration of such data, however, 
need not be limited to studies or other information provided by 
the polluter.92 Instead, the Agency can use its own resources to 
compile and interpret data for the pollution limitations. 
For 1983 limitations, section 304(b)(2)(B) also allows the 
Agency to independently consider all the above data. Congress 
85. ld. at 323, 326. 
86. ld. at 326. 
87.ld. 
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1976). 
89. ld. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1976). 
90. In one case, American Petroleum Inst. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 540 
F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976), the court only required that the Agency conduct a serious 
and comprehensive 8tudy of compliance costs. After so doing, the Agency then has dis-
cretion to select the point of diminishing returns. ld. at 1038. 
91. L.H. at 170. The required technology for the 1977 limitations set the minimum 
level of control in order to achieve uniformity. 
92. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sese. 34 (1972). 
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intended, however, that the Agency discard the cost-benefit 
analysis.98 Instead, the Agency must only take costs into consid-
eration in setting 1983 limitations, using a reasonableness 
standard.94 
Section 40395 authorizes the Agency to regulate pollution 
discharged into the ocean. This section includes all pollution dis-
charged from any sewer outfall regardless of the distance from 
the shoreline.96 To avoid undermining the scope of this section, 
Congress stated that this section controls, notwithstanding any 
legislation to the contrary.9? 
Finally, section 511(c) was design~d to settle any conflict 
which might arise between the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act.98 Section 511(c) 
accomplishes this purpose by limiting the situations in which 
the Agency must comply with the National Policy Act require-
ment of a Statement.D9 In essence, section 511(c) freed the 
Agency's hands in its effort to ful:fill the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act's goals.loD 
m. CONCLUSION 
In both Association of Pacific Fisheries and Kilroy, the 
Ninth Circuit examined the legislative history of the Act in its 
effort to fulfill the congressional intent for the challenged provi-
sions. The Pacific Fisheries panel properly construed the costs 
and data provisions of section 301 for both the "1977 and the 
1983 limitations. The Kilroy court also correctly afforded section 
511(c) a narrow construction. The Kilroy court, however, mis-
construed section 403. 
93. L.H. at 170. Congress intended that for 1983, no balancing test be required. See 
also Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 295, 
300 (1980). 
94. Id. In determining what is reasonable, the Agency must evaluate what needs to 
be done to help eliminate pollution discharge and what the available technology can 
achieve, without regard to cost. Id. ' 
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). 
96. L.H. at 177. 
97.Id. 
98. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). See also note 6 supra. 
99. See note 6 supra. 
100. L.H. at 182. 
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Congress intended that the Agency's power to regulate 
ocean disposal of pollutants to be derived only from section 
403.101 The Kilroy court interpreted section 301 as the source of 
this power and construed section 403 as a supplement to section 
301. This interpretation frustrates the clear intent of Congress. 
Fortunately, this misconstruction proved harmless because the 
Kilroy court decided that the result would be the same under 
either section. It should be noted, however, that section 301 is 
not all encompassing. Congress intended that section 403 abso-
lutely control ocean disposal, "any other legislation to the con-
trary notwithstanding."103 Further misinterpretations of con-
gressional intent may be avoided by close examination of the 
legislative history of individual provisions of the Act. 
Robinson R. Ng* 
101. See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text. 
102. L.H. at 177. The district court found this absolute language may still give rise 
to a "possibility that section 403 requirements ••• apply in addition to section 301's." 
440 F. Supp. at 323. The language itself, however, appears not to allow this "possibility." 
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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